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EXCESSIVELY UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE AND THE EXCESSIVE
FINES CLAUSE IN VIRGINIA
Rachel Jones*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a small business owner in Virginia with the opportunity to
buy equipment for your business from an independent seller. You decide to bring
money in cash to purchase the equipment because you think it will give you a better
negotiating position. As you drive to the appointment with the seller, you are pulled
over by a police officer for a minor traffic violation. During this traffic stop, the
police officer searches your car and asks you to disclose any weapons, illegal sub-
stances, or large amounts of cash you may have on your person or in your vehicle.
You disclose to the officer that you have a large amount of cash because you are
headed to buy business equipment. The officer then arrests you and seizes the money,
alleging that it is connected to drug trafficking.
While this scenario may seem far-fetched, it happened to Mandrel Stuart on
Interstate 66 in Virginia.1 Stuart owned a barbeque restaurant in Staunton, Virginia
and was headed to buy restaurant equipment in Northern Virginia when he was
stopped by a Fairfax County officer for having a video screen in his vehicle.2 The
officer proceeded to search the car and found $17,000 in cash as well as a few
“green” “flakes,” which the officer assumed was marijuana.3 Stuart was arrested and
the $17,000 was seized through an action of civil asset forfeiture.4 Stuart was
eventually acquitted of all criminal charges resulting from the arrest, but it took over
a year and an arduous legal process5 to get the $17,000 back.6
* JD, William & Mary Law School, 2017; BA, American University, 2013. I would like
to thank my parents, Craig Jones and Linda Fussell, for their unwavering support in all of my
endeavors. I would also like to thank the editorial staff and executive board of the William
& Mary Bill of Rights Journal for all their work on this and other student notes.
1 See NBC29 Special Report: Asset Forfeiture Laws, NBC29.COM (May 28, 2015, 5:32
PM), http://www.nbc29.com/story/29067896/nbc29-special-report-asset-forfeiture-laws [https://
perma.cc/2X53-H6X8] [hereinafter NBC29 Special Report].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 It is estimated that a contest to a civil asset forfeiture “[c]ould cost at least $10,000[,]” and
some defense attorneys “will not accept a [civil forfeiture] case unless the forfeiture value is
large.” Karis Ann-Yu Chi, Comment, Follow the Money: Getting to the Root of the Problem with
Civil Asset Forfeiture in California, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1635, 1642 (2002) (footnote omitted).
6 NBC29 Special Report, supra note 1.
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In fact, Stuart was lucky to have any of his seized money returned. In Virginia,
the $17,000 could be seized and forfeited to the state even if Stuart was acquitted by
a jury of any crime.7 Even though having property forfeited to the state when a jury has
found insufficient evidence to prove a crime was committed may seem like an exces-
sive fine, in Virginia, the Commonwealth only has to prove that a crime was com-
mitted “by clear and convincing evidence” in order to seize and forfeit property.8
How can police take a person’s property without first proving a crime was
committed, especially in a state and nation that guarantees that no excessive fine will
be levied against its citizens? Simple. Civil asset forfeiture laws “allow[ ] police to
seize—and then keep or sell—any property they allege is involved in a crime.”9
Because police agencies benefit financially from civil forfeitures, forfeiture is pur-
sued aggressively at both the state and federal level.10 Further, seized assets may be
“thousands of times more valuable than contraband sold by defendants[,]”11 which
provides an incentive for police to seize high value chattels. With many state and
local police agencies facing budget cuts, forfeiture proceeds are used by these
agencies to offset lost funding.12 One survey of police departments reported that
7 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-386.1, 386.22 (West 2016); Rob Poggenklass, Reform
Virginia’s Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws to Remove the Profit Incentive and Curtail the Abuse
of Power, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. ONLINE 75, 76 (2016).
8 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10 (West 2016) (amending VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10
(West 2015)). When Stuart’s property was seized, the Commonwealth only had to prove that
a crime was committed by the preponderance of the evidence. NBC29 Special Report, supra
note 1. The law has since been amended to increase the Commonwealth’s burden of proof
to clear and convincing evidence. Compare § 19.2-386.10 (West 2016), with § 19.2-386.10
(West 2015).
9 Asset Forfeiture Abuse, AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-re
form/reforming-police-practices/asset-forfeiture-abuse [https://perma.cc/4VJF-V83Z]. But see
Douglas Leff, Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture: Taking the Profit out of Crime, FBI:
FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (Apr. 2012), https://leb.fbi.gov/2012/april/money-laundering
-and-asset-forfeiture-taking-the-profit-out-of-crime [https://perma.cc/9943-DHUF] (defining
asset forfeiture as a way to “[t]ak[e] the [p]rofit [o]ut of [c]rime” instead of a revenue raising
mechanism); Asset Forfeiture Program, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/afp [https://
perma.cc/2ZK2-P2VM] (emphasizing the “remov[al] [of] the proceeds of crime and other
assets relied upon by criminals and their associates to perpetuate their criminal activity against
our society”).
10 See DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE
OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 6 (2d ed. 2015), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11
/policing-for-profit-2nd-edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4ZK-W3SE].
11 Brent Skorup, Comment, Ensuring Eighth Amendment Protection from Excessive Fines
in Civil Asset Forfeiture Cases, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 427, 427 (2012) (citing Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 693 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part) (involving the seizure of a yacht where one marijuana cigarette was found); United
States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1991) (concerning the seizure of
a $145,000 condominium at which the defendant sold $250 worth of cocaine)).
12 See generally Eric Moores, Note, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51
ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 784–85 (2009) (discussing how local police agencies depend on asset
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forty percent of police executives believe civil forfeiture funds are “necessary as a
budget supplement.”13
Today, the majority of asset forfeitures occur through civil asset forfeiture.14 In
Virginia, civil forfeitures are a powerful law enforcement tool because they require
a lower standard of proof than criminal forfeitures,15 may be brought and decided
prior to any criminal trial,16 and Virginia courts have not established an Excessive
Fines Test that adequately protects citizens.17 Further, police may seize essentially
any type of property, as long as the property can be connected, however tenuously,
to a crime.18
Civil forfeiture has steadily increased in Virginia,19 which in turn has increased
public concern regarding the legitimacy of the practice.20 Multiple constitutional
challenges can be made against the practice of civil asset forfeiture and substantial
literature has been devoted to the topic. However, the Supreme Court “has rebuffed
most constitutional challenges by finding that the particular constitutional right
forfeiture to supplement budgets); Merris Badcock, Virginia: Proposed Budget Cuts Heavy
for State Police, Corrections, YOUR4STATE.COM (Oct. 22, 2016, 7:08 PM), http://www.your
4state.com/news/news/virginia-proposed-budget-cuts-heavy-for-state-police-corrections
[https://perma.cc/R7UW-Y56U] (discussing $43 million in Virginia state budget cuts from
the Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security); The Impact of the Economic Downturn
on American Police Agencies, U.S. DEP’T JUST.: COPS, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default
.asp?Item=2602 [https://perma.cc/S5Z2-TS7B] (“The economic downturn of the past several
years has devastated local economies and their local law enforcement agencies.”).
13 A Truck in the Dock: How the Police Can Seize Your Stuff When You Have Not Been
Proven Guilty of Anything, ECONOMIST (May 27, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node
/16219747 [https://perma.cc/DG9K-4NQP] [hereinafter A Truck in the Dock].
14 CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 10, at 13 (demonstrating that only thirteen percent of
all Department of Justice (DOJ) forfeitures are criminal asset forfeitures, while eighty-seven
percent of all DOJ forfeitures are civil asset forfeitures).
15 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10 (West 2016); Scott Bullock, Real Changes Needed
in Virginia Forfeiture Law, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Oct. 14, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://
www.richmond.com/news/article_b4f906d3-2488-5869-b9c3-a1e3f9ede354.html?mode
=story [https://perma.cc/2GE6-2YBF].
16 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-386.1, 386.22 (West 2016); NBC29 Special Report, supra
note 1.
17 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. One 1970, 2 Dr. H.T. Lincoln Auto., Identification No.
OY89A826833, 186 S.E.2d 279 (Va. 1972).
18 See VA. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., FORFEITED ASSET SHARING PROGRAM
MANUAL 1 (2015), https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications
/dcjs/forfeited-asset-sharing-program-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS5S-3DS7] [hereinafter
FORFEITED ASSET SHARING PROGRAM MANUAL].
19 CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 10, at 138.
20 See, e.g., Mark Bowes, Virginia Forfeiture Laws Come Under Scrutiny, ROANOKE
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2015, 5:15 PM), http://www.roanoke.com/news/politics/virginia-forfeiture
-laws-come-under-scrutiny/article_de1cd6f2-81a0-54b3-89ab-21cc0b22a2a8.html  [https://
perma.cc/WR9X-AR5Z]; NBC29 Special Report, supra note 1.
1396 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1393
either does not apply in a civil proceeding, or that it cannot be asserted by the prop-
erty owner, who is not officially a party to the proceeding.”21 In addition to claims
of Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines violations, objections include: violations of
the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause,22 violations of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,23 and criticisms that law enforcement
directly profits and therefore has a financial stake in forfeitures.24 Though all of
these challenges call the legitimacy of civil asset forfeiture into question, this Note
focuses specifically on Excessive Fines Clause violations.
Civil asset forfeiture laws in Virginia have recently come under scrutiny, though
efforts to reform the laws through the legislature have largely failed.25 In the absence
21 Chi, supra note 5, at 1641.
22 The Double Jeopardy Clause states, “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. V. In United
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996), the Supreme Court held that in rem civil forfeitures
do not constitute “punishment . . . for [the purpose of the] Double Jeopardy Clause[,]” id. at
292, because “[s]ince the earliest years of this Nation, Congress has authorized the Gov-
ernment to seek parallel in rem civil forfeiture actions and criminal prosecutions based upon
the same underlying events[,]” id. at 274.
23 The Fifth Amendment states, “[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment states, “[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In Bennis v. Michigan, the Court found that
“an owner’s interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property
is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use[,]” and before a
joint owner was able to defend her innocent ownership of the property. 516 U.S. 442, 446
(1996).
24 Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 41 (1998) (“[T]he forfeiture laws in particular are producing
self-financing, unaccountable law enforcement agencies divorced from any meaningful
legislative oversight. There are numerous examples of such semi-independent agencies tar-
geting assets with no regard for the rights, safety, or even the lives of the suspects.” (footnote
omitted)).
25 Bowes, supra note 20. In 2016, the Virginia General Assembly passed a law raising
the Commonwealth’s burden of proof from a “preponderance of the evidence” standard to
a “clear and convincing evidence” standard. Chris Horne, Getting It Back: A Change in
Property Seizure Law, WAVY (July 21, 2016, 8:24 PM), http://wavy.com/investigative-story
/getting-it-back-a-change-in-property-seizure-law/ [https://perma.cc/X855-7DHS]. When the
bill was still in the state Senate, Senator Chap Petersen proposed a substitute amendment that
would require a criminal conviction of the property owner before the state could seize any
assets. S. 457, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin
/legp604.exe?161+ful+SB457S1 [https://perma.cc/3H2B-E87R]. Though this amendment
would have provided substantially more protection for property owners, the state Senate
declined to make meaningful changes to civil asset forfeiture law and rejected the proposed
amendment. 2016 Session, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604
.exe?161+sum+SB457 [https://perma.cc/82HW-6YH8].
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of meaningful legislative reform, the responsibility to protect citizens from civil
asset forfeitures that result in excessive fines falls on Virginia Courts. By articulating
an Excessive Fines Test for civil asset forfeitures, Virginia Courts will be better able
to ensure that citizens are not subject to excessive fines by the government in vio-
lation of their constitutional rights.
This Note will demonstrate the need for an Excessive Fines Test in Virginia in
order to preserve the constitutional rights guaranteed in article I, section 9 of Vir-
ginia’s Constitution26 and the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.27
This Note will also propose a five-factor test that will protect citizens from excessive
fines.28 Part I provides a brief introduction and overview of the history of civil asset
forfeiture in the United States. Part II examines the state of civil asset forfeiture in
Virginia. Part III discusses how the use of various Excessive Fines Tests have im-
pacted citizen’s constitutional rights. Part IV develops a test that adequately protects
Virginians from excessive fines.
I. THE HISTORY OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Historical Context
It is necessary to consider the history of asset forfeiture in order to understand
the complicated legal framework and differences between criminal and civil asset
forfeiture. The origins of forfeiture can be traced back to Biblical and pre-Judeo-
Christian practices that evolved into the deodand in Medieval England.29 Under the
26 VA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted; that the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases
of invasion or rebellion, the public safety may require; and the General
Assembly shall not pass any bill of attainder, or any ex post facto law.
Id.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
28 See infra Part IV.
29 See generally Calero v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680–85 & n.17
(1974) (citing Exodus 21:28 (“If an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be
stoned: and his flesh shall not be eaten.”)); Michael van den Berg, Comment, Proposing a
Transactional Approach to Civil Forfeiture Reform, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 867, 873 (2015) (citing
Jacob J. Finklestein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures,
Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 181 (1973);
Anna Pervukhin, Deodands: A Study in the Creation of Common Law Rules, 47 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 237, 241 (2005)). Forfeiture of property is considered an ancient practice. Moores,
supra note 12, at 780–81; Skorup, supra note 11, at 432; van den Berg, supra, at 873.
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common law in England, three types of forfeiture were established: deodand,30 for-
feiture upon conviction for a felony or treason,31 and statutory forfeiture.32
Of the three types of forfeiture articulated under the common law, only statutory
forfeiture managed to survive in the United States.33 The U.S. Constitution does not
allow forfeiture of estate as a punishment for treason or felons.34 Though the
“Founding Fathers nearly abolished [both] criminal and civil forfeiture[,]”35 “[t]he
First Congress [also] passed laws subjecting ships and cargos involved in customs
offenses to forfeiture.”36 It is generally accepted that these laws were used to target
pirates and smugglers, as it was easier to prosecute a vessel, and seize its cargo than
30 The “conventional view” is that is that the concept of forfeiture “arose from the deodand”
in England. Brant C. Hadaway, Comment, Executive Privateers: A Discussion on Why the
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act Will Not Significantly Reform the Practice of Forfeiture,
55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 81, 88 (2000). William Blackstone describes that under deodand, “[t]he
value of the instrument was forfeited to the King, in the belief that the King would provide
the money for the Masses to be said for the good of the dead man’s soul, or insure that the
deodand was put to charitable uses.” Calero, 416 U.S. at 680–81 (citing 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300). Essentially, the deodand required that an object that
had caused the death of a king’s subject be forfeited directly to the Crown, presumably as
a sort of punishment for an owner’s negligent care of the property. Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993) (“As Blackstone put it, ‘such misfortunes are in part owing to the
negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly punished by such forfeiture.’” (citing
BLACKSTONE, supra, at *301)); van den Berg, supra note 29, at 873. Deodand was eventually
abolished in England in 1846. See Barclay Thomas Johnson, Note, Restoring Civility—The Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture
System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (2002).
31 Forfeiture as a punishment for those convicted of a felony or treason evolved from the
concept of deodand. Austin, 509 U.S. at 611. Under this type of forfeiture, “[t]he convicted
felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and his lands escheated to his lord; the convicted
traitor forfeited all of his property, real and personal, to the Crown.” Calero, 416 U.S. at 682
(citing 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 68–71 (3d ed. 1927); 1 FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 351 (2d ed. 1909)).
32 Statutory forfeiture provided for the forfeiture of offending objects that had been used
in violation of customs and revenue laws, “likely a product of the confluence and merger of
the deodand tradition and the belief that the right to own property could be denied the
wrongdoer.” Calero, 416 U.S. at 682. Most statutory forfeitures were considered in rem
proceedings and enforced “in the Court of Exchequer to forfeit the property,” “in violation
of the customs and revenue laws.” Id. (citing C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133,
137–38 (1943); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at *261–62).
33 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 613; Hadaway, supra note 30, at 89 (“Forfeiture was a hated
measure among the colonists, and both the Constitution and statutes passed by the First
Congress forbade the use of criminal forfeiture in convictions for treason and federal
felonies.” (footnotes omitted)).
34 Austin, 509 U.S. at 613 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2; Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch.
9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117).
35 See generally Skorup, supra note 11.
36 Austin, 509 U.S. at 613. See generally The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
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to prosecute the owner of the vessel who likely lived in Europe.37 These laws were
used in The Palmyra,38 where a Spanish vessel was seized and accused of piratical
aggression.39 In this case, the Court articulated the basis of civil asset forfeiture in
the United States, stating that “[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the of-
fender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing . . .” and “no personal
conviction of the offender is necessary to enforce a forfeiture in rem.”40 These in
rem forfeitures remained relevant in maritime law, though were essentially dormant
until the 1970s.41
Civil asset forfeiture rose to prominence in the 1970s and 1980s, and became
a powerful tool used to fight the war on drugs.42 In 1970, Congress passed the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (CDAPCA).43 This act
marked the first time civil asset forfeiture was used to combat the trafficking of illegal
drugs.44 The civil asset provision of CDAPCA was codified in 21 U.S.C. § 881
(2012), and only allowed for civil asset forfeiture of conveyances, drug manufactur-
ing and storage equipment, and drugs.45 Because Section 881 in its original form
was fairly modest, forfeiture was not regularly pursued by law enforcement.46
37 See Hadaway, supra note 30, at 89; Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken [https://perma.cc/2SA2-DCS3].
38 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
39 See id. at 3; see also Calero v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683–84 (1974).
40 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14–15.
41 See Hadaway, supra note 30, at 89–90 (noting that forfeiture was initially used for both
revenue cases and admiralty laws in the United States, but when the Sixteenth Amendment
was passed forfeitures mostly became a thing of the past and remained in U.S. law through
admiralty laws). Civil forfeiture briefly surfaced again following the Civil War under the
Confiscation Acts. van den Berg, supra note 29, at 875 (“[T]he doctrine long remained
dormant in the American legal landscape, emerging only briefly during the Civil War as the
Confiscation Acts, which allowed for the seizure of property belonging to those who aided
the rebellion.”). It also surfaced during the Prohibition era under the National Prohibition
Act. Hadaway, supra note 30, at 89–91.
42 See generally, e.g., Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 24; Hadaway, supra note 30;
Johnson, supra note 30; Chet Little, Note, Civil Forfeiture and the Excessive Fines Clause:
Does Bajakajian Provide False Hope for Drug-Related Offenders?, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 203 (2000); van den Berg, supra note 29.
43 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1238 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
44 See van den Berg, supra note 29, at 875.
45 CDAPCA did not allow for civil forfeiture of money, negotiable securities, or real
property. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1048.
46 See Hadaway, supra note 30, at 92. Section 881 underwent many amendments, the first
of which expanded the type of property subject to forfeiture to include money, negotiable
instruments, securities, or other property exchanged for illicit drugs. Johnson, supra note 30,
at 1049–50 (stating that paragraph six of the Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978 allowed
“[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished . . . in
exchange for a controlled substance.” (quoting Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 3777
(1978))). Essentially, this broadened the law to include proceeds from drug transactions. This
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The most significant amendments made to Section 881 occurred in 1984 with
the enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA), which expanded
the range of allowed forfeitures to include the forfeiture of real property and earmarked
forfeited assets for law enforcement.47 After the CCCA was enacted, the proceeds
of forfeiture were deposited directly into the Department of Justice’s Forfeiture Fund
or the Department of Treasury’s Forfeiture Fund, providing law enforcement with a
revenue raising incentive to seize property through civil asset forfeiture.48 The fact
that law enforcement could benefit from civil asset forfeiture after 1984 resulted in
a staggering increase in asset forfeitures.49
B. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA)50 was passed in re-
sponse to widespread law enforcement abuses in the late 1980s and 1990s,51 as well
as Supreme Court decisions.52 While CAFRA attempted to address some of these
abuses, problems with civil asset forfeiture still exist.53
expansion in the type of property that could be forfeited to the state through civil asset forfeiture
increased seizures sixfold and forfeitures twentyfold. Hadaway, supra note 30, at 92–93.
47 See Hadaway, supra note 30, at 93; Moores, supra note 12, at 781–82. Prior to the
CCCA, the funds gained through forfeiture were deposited into the general fund of the U.S.
Treasury. See Hadaway, supra note 30, at 93; Johnson, supra note 30, at 1050.
48 See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4) (2012); 31 U.S.C. § 9703 (2012); Hadaway, supra note 30,
at 91; Johnson, supra note 30, at 1050.
49 See Little, supra note 42, at 208 (“Between its inception in 1985 and 1991, Section 881
resulted in the forfeiture of more than 1.5-billion dollars in assets. From 1992 to 1997,
federal agencies almost doubled that amount.” (footnotes omitted)); van den Berg, supra note
29, at 876 (“The resulting revenue gains have been staggering: in 2012 the government
seized $4.2 billion in property and has enjoyed other notable achievements, such as the
seizure of real estate properties from Latin American drug kingpins.” (footnote omitted)).
50 Pub. L. No. 106-18, 114 Stat. 202 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
and 28 U.S.C.).
51 See Moores, supra note 12, at 182–83.
52 See generally United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602 (1993).
53 See generally Chip Mellor, Civil Forfeiture Laws and the Continued Assault on Private
Property, FORBES (June 8, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2011/06/08/property-civ
il-forfeiture.html [https://perma.cc/W2Y2-ECQZ]; Stillman, supra note 37; A Truck in the
Dock, supra note 13. While CAFRA did not remedy all abuses of civil asset forfeiture, it did
make some important changes to asset forfeiture law, including shifting the burden of proof
from the property owner onto the government, eliminating the requirement of a cost bond,
and providing more protections to owners of real property that has been seized and indigent
property owners. Hadaway, supra note 30, at 86–87. CAFRA also increased the burden that
the government originally has to show from probable cause to the preponderance of the
evidence standard. Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Validity, Construction, and Application of Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), 195 A.L.R. FED. 349 (2004) (“CAFRA places
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For all of its reforms, CAFRA failed to change the nature of civil asset forfei-
ture—lucrative seizures still occur on a large scale and the problematic fundraising
incentive still exists at both the federal and state level.54 Federally, years after CAFRA
was adopted, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives came under
fire for adopting a new meaning for the “ATF” acronym, “Always Think Forfeiture,”
and using this label on some of their equipment that was purchased with funds raised
from forfeitures.55 However, this scandal did not prevent the Attorney General from
actively pursuing civil asset forfeiture.56
One important change CAFRA made was the use of the grossly disproportionate
standard when determining if a civil asset forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine.57
While the grossly disproportionate standard is now codified into federal law, the
Supreme Court and the legislature failed to articulate a test to determine what con-
stitutes a grossly disproportionate seizure and what does not. This has allowed state
and circuit courts to develop different analyses of the grossly disproportionate
standard,58 which has resulted in different constitutional implications for civil asset
forfeiture and the Excessive Fines Clause.
C. Constitutional Context
The Eighth Amendment states, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”59 This clause
was “taken verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689[,]” and was not
extensively discussed by the First Congress during the debates over ratification of
the Bill of Rights, leaving courts with little direction as to what constitutes an ex-
cessive fine.60
the burden of proof . . . on the government to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the property is subject to forfeiture. Prior to CAFRA, the government was only required
to show that there was probable cause . . . .”).
54 See generally MARIAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT:
THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 6 (2010), http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other
_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6X9-PLU9].
55 Mellor, supra note 53.
56 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: ASSET FORFEITURE & MONEY LAUNDERING SECTION,
ASSET FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL 1 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file
/839521/download [https://perma.cc/34JA-P83D].
57 In determining if the forfeiture is excessive, the court compares the forfeiture to the
gravity of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture, and if the court finds the forfeiture is
grossly disproportionate to the offense it may reduce or eliminate the forfeiture as necessary
to avoid a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-18, § 2, 114 Stat. 202.
58 See infra Part III.
59 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
60 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998).
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The Supreme Court has stated that the Excessive Fines Clause was “intended to
prevent the government from abusing its power to punish, and therefore that ‘the
Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by
and payable to the government.’”61 Later, the Supreme Court noted that it had “little
occasion to interpret, and ha[d] never actually applied, the Excessive Fines Clause.”62
In Austin v. United States,63 the Supreme Court found that civil asset forfeitures
were at least partially punitive and subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.64 In United
States v. Bajakajian,65 the Court applied the Excessive Fines Clause for the first
time, and defined excessive, stating “‘[e]xcessive’ means surpassing the usual, the
proper, or a normal measure of proportion.”66 These cases represent the seminal
cases involving civil asset forfeiture and the Excessive Fines Clause.
During the summer of 1990, Richard Austin was approached in his body shop
and agreed to sell two grams of cocaine.67 Austin then went to his mobile home and
returned to the body shop with the cocaine, which he sold.68 Subsequently, state
authorities executed a search warrant on both the body shop and the home and found
small amounts of marijuana and cocaine, a gun, drug paraphernalia, and $4,700 in
cash.69 Austin pleaded guilty in state court to one count of possessing cocaine with
intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.70 After the
criminal proceeding, the United States sought to seize Austin’s mobile home and
body shop through an in rem proceeding in federal court, as sanctioned by Section
881(a)(4) and (a)(7).71 Austin contested the forfeiture proceeding, arguing that the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil asset forfeiture cases.72
In its decision, the Supreme Court recognized that they had only considered the
Excessive Fines Clause once before Austin.73 After an extensive historical analysis
61 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 607 (1993) (internal citation omitted) (quoting
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 268 (1989)). The
only time the Court had addressed the Excessive Fines Clause prior to Austin was in
Browning-Ferris Industries, where the Court addressed the question of whether the Exces-
sive Fines Clause limited the award of punitive damages to a private party in a civil suit
when the government did not prosecute the action nor have any right to receive a share of
damages. 492 U.S. at 259–60.
62 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 327.
63 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
64 See id. at 604.
65 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
66 Id. at 335.
67 Austin, 509 U.S. at 605.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 604.
71 Id. at 604–05.
72 Id. at 606.
73 Id. (“In Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt. . . . , we held that the Excessive Fines Clause
does not limit the award of punitive damages to a private party in a civil suit when the
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that considered the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment, the legisla-
tive intent behind Section 881, and the legislative history that provided evidence that
Congress understood Section 881 as serving both to deter and punish, the Court
found that civil asset forfeiture, at least in part, serves to punish the owner.74 Because
the Court found that civil asset forfeiture “constitutes ‘payment to a sovereign as
punishment for some offense,’” it is “subject to the limitations [provided in] the . . .
Excessive Fines Clause.”75 Though the Court found civil asset forfeiture served
some punitive purposes, it is important to note that the decision did not exclude the
possibility that a forfeiture serves “remedial purposes” even though it is subject to
the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause.76
This case constituted an important shift in the understanding of civil asset
forfeiture in the United States. Prior to Austin, civil asset forfeitures were considered
purely remedial, as the legal fiction of “the thing is primarily considered the of-
fender” reigned.77 Now that civil asset forfeitures were considered punitive and
subject to the Excessive Fines Clause, the question of how to determine what
constitutes an “excessive fine” remained. The Court in Austin explicitly declined to
establish a test for determining whether a forfeiture is constitutionally excessive,
reasoning that lower courts needed to consider the question in the first instance.78
The Court addressed this question five years later in United States v. Bajakajian.
In 1994, Hosep Bajakajian, an immigrant from Syria, attempted to take $357,144
on a flight from Los Angeles to Italy in violation of federal reporting laws.79 Though
the district court found that Bajakajian failed to report the cash because of a fear and
distrust of the government80 and that the funds were intended to pay a lawful debt,
it also determined that “the entire $357,144 was subject to forfeiture because [the
money] was involved in the offense.”81 However, the district court believed that
even though federal statutes directed the imposition of full forfeiture, in this case
that would result in an “extraordinarily harsh” punishment that would be “grossly
disproportionate to the offense in question,” and therefore would violate the Exces-
sive Fines Clause.82 After appeals by both the government and Bajakajian, the case
was brought before the Supreme Court to determine “whether forfeiture of the entire
government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the
damages.” (citation omitted)).
74 Id. at 614–16.
75 Id. at 622 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 265 (1989)).
76 Id. at 622 n.14.
77 Id. at 616.
78 Id. at 622.
79 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1998).
80 Bajakajian grew up in Syria, where he was a member of the Armenian minority,
leading to an inherent distrust of government. Id. at 326.
81 Id. at 325–26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82 Id. at 326.
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$357,144 that [Bajakajian] failed to declare would violate the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment.”83
Because the Court had not previously considered this question, the Court looked
to their cases interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to define a
constitutional excessiveness standard.84 In its evaluation, the Court found that judg-
ments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong first to the legislature,
and adopted the standard of gross disproportionality articulated in the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause precedents.85 The Court then compared the gravity of
the offense to the forfeiture to determine if the forfeiture was grossly disproportion-
ate.86 However, in doing so, the Court did not dictate a factor test, nor limit itself to
a comparison of the forfeiture amount to the gravity of the offense.87 Instead, it left
the circuit courts and states to determine their own test for gross disproportionance.88
The Court has not addressed the Excessive Fines Clause since Bajakajian.
In applying the grossly disproportionate standard, the Court held that the full
forfeiture of Bajakajian’s money would violate the Excessive Fines Clause.89
After these two important Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s, and amidst
widespread abuse of civil asset forfeiture,90 Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfei-
ture Reform Act in 2000 which made substantial changes to federal civil asset for-
feiture reform laws.91
II. THE STATE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE IN VIRGINIA
Virginia’s Constitution mirrors the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause,
stating “[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed.”92
Recently, civil asset forfeiture has come under fire in Virginia.93 Travis Fain
notes that “[t]he state version [of civil asset forfeiture] has seen less scrutiny [than
the federal version], but is used much more routinely, according to local law enforce-
ment.”94 Virginia’s civil asset forfeiture laws are significantly different than the
83 Id. at 324.
84 Id. at 336.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 339–40.
87 See id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 344.
90 See CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 10, at 6.
91 Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
and 28 U.S.C.).
92 VA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
93 See generally Bowes, supra note 20; Bullock, supra note 15; Travis Fain, Virginia’s
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Effort Goes Down Again, DAILY PRESS (Apr. 15, 2015, 12:58
PM), http://www.dailypress.com/news/politics/dp-virginias-civil-asset-forfeiture-reform-ef
fort-goes-down-again-20150415-story.html [https://perma.cc/K5EM-DXKY]; NBC29 Special
Report, supra note 1.
94 Fain, supra note 93.
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federal forfeiture laws dictated in CAFRA.95 In Virginia, all asset forfeitures require
a hearing and the burden of proof falls on the Commonwealth, who must prove, by
“clear and convincing evidence,” that the property forfeited is connected to the
underlying criminal charge.96 When filing an information for civil asset forfeiture
in Virginia, all the State need provide is the name of all defendants, including all
owners and lienholders, specifically describe the property, set forth the grounds of
forfeiture, ask that the property seized be condemned and sold, and ask that all
interested parties be notified to appear and “show cause why such property should
not be forfeited.”97
In Virginia, there are no restrictions on the type of property that can be seized
through forfeiture.98 The Commonwealth can seize property used in connection with
or derived from terrorism,99 computer crimes100 (including unlawful electronic com-
munication devices101), money laundering,102 cigarettes sold or attempted to be sold
in an unlawful delivery sale103 (including forfeiture of counterfeit and contraband
cigarettes104), illegal drug transactions,105 and firearms in violation of Virginia Code
Article 6.1106 (including weapons that are concealed, possessed, transported, or
carried in violation of the law107). Today, civil asset forfeiture is used most com-
monly in drug cases.108 To establish a valid forfeiture, the property seized must be
“substantially connected” to the manufacture, sale, or distribution of illegal nar-
cotics.109 If police believe property is connected with or derived from illegal drug
transactions, “all moneys or other property, real or personal, traceable to such an
exchange, together with any interest or profits derived from the investment of such
money or other property” may be seized.110 This means that any type of property can
be seized if police can show that the property was purchased with proceeds from
illegal activity.
95 See Bowes, supra note 20.
96 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10 (West 2016) (amending VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10
(West 2015)).
97 Id. § 19.2-386.1.
98 FORFEITED ASSET SHARING PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 18, at 1 (“Commonly
seized items include cash, vehicles, cellular phones, televisions, handguns, and jewelry.”).
99 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.15 (West 2016).
100 Id. § 19.2-386.17.
101 Id. § 19.2-386.18.
102 Id. § 19.2-386.19.
103 Id. § 19.2-386.20.
104 Id. § 19.2-386.21.
105 Id. § 19.2-386.22.
106 Id. § 19.2-386.27.
107 Id. § 19.2-386.28.
108 Skorup, supra note 11, at 427 (quoting Little, supra note 42, at 204).
109 FORFEITED ASSET SHARING PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 18, at 2.
110 § 19.2-386.22.
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In Virginia, agencies take full advantage of this allowance.111 Since 2008, more
than $62,000,000 in assets have been seized by Virginia law enforcement.112 Mark
Bowes reports:
On the high end, gold Krugerrand coins, $36,000 diamond-
encrusted watches, a $100,000 Porsche, tricked-out chopper
motorcycles, $20,000 worth of sneakers, custom 31-foot fishing
boats, waterfront homes and piles of cash—as much as $401,200
in a single bust—top the list of loot that police confiscated since
2008 through Virginia’s civil forfeiture program.113
The Department of Criminal Justice reports that for the 2016 fiscal year,
$2,767,399.57 had been disbursed to local agencies through the Forfeiture Asset
Sharing Program, a decrease from the $5,600,969.50 disbursed in 2015, and that
$105,758,764.59 has been disbursed to local agencies since the program started in
1991.114
One of the most common complaints against civil asset forfeiture is that the
practice gives police an incentive to seize people’s property.115 Virginia’s Constitu-
tion requires all property that is forfeited to the Commonwealth go into the Literary
Fund, a fund specifically designated to benefit schools in Virginia.116 However, the
Virginia Constitution also allows the General Assembly to exempt payment into the
Literary Fund for assets forfeited to the Commonwealth because of a violation of
Virginia drug laws.117 In 1991, the General Assembly enacted a law allowing for this
exemption, which redirected funds gained through civil asset forfeiture from the
Literary Fund to the police departments where the forfeitures occurred.118 This in-
centivized local agencies to “pursue the dealers more rigorously and convert their
illegal gains into crime fighting resources.”119 However, many people think that this
incentive encourages policing for profit and that local agencies will pursue forfeiture
as a way to increase their budgets “at the expense of other policing priorities.”120 The
resulting push for forfeiture can net innocent property owners in with guilty property
111 See Bowes, supra note 20.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2016), http://vscc.virginia
.gov/RD193%20VSCC%202015%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTP3-Y4D9].
115 See generally WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 54.
116 FORFEITED ASSET SHARING PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 18, at 1.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 54, at 6.
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owners at both the federal and local levels, which can result in excessive fines,
especially for innocent property owners.121
In an attempt to remedy the possibility that innocent owners will have their
property forfeited to the Commonwealth, legislators in the Virginia House of
Representatives122 and Senate introduced a bill during the regular session of the
2015 General Assembly that would require criminal defendants to be convicted of
a crime before their property could be forfeited to the Commonwealth.123 Unfortu-
nately, this bill was killed in the Senate and the issue of civil asset forfeiture was
sent to the Virginia Crime Commission for review.124 The Virginia Crime Commis-
sion found that in Virginia, seventy-five percent of cases result in forfeiture and
twenty-five percent of cases result in the item being returned to the owner or a
lienholder, most forfeitures are a result of default or some type of plea agreement
or settlement, and very few cases go to trial.125 Five policy options were presented
to the Crime Commission for consideration.126 The Crime Commission failed to
endorse any of the policy options, including whether “a criminal conviction should
be required before any civil forfeiture could be ordered” and if the burden of proof
on the Commonwealth should be increased from the “preponderance of the evi-
dence” standard to a “clear and convincing evidence standard.”127
Following the Virginia Crime Commission report, state Senator Charles Carrico
introduced a bill that would increase the Commonwealth’s burden of proof in civil
asset forfeiture cases to a “clear and convincing evidence” standard while maintain-
ing a preponderance of the evidence standard for a person claiming the forfeited
property.128 The Senate and House unanimously passed this bill, and it was approved
by the Governor on April 1, 2016.129 Though the heightened standard of proof is a
step in the right direction, requiring that the Commonwealth prove that property is
connected to an underlying crime only by clear and convincing evidence does not
121 John R. Emshwiller & Gary Fields, Federal Asset Seizures Rise, Netting Innocent with
Guilty, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903
480904576512253265073870 [https://perma.cc/K6SM-NAKF].
122 Peter Dujardin & Ashley K. Speed, McAuliffe Wants Criminal Convictions Before
Forfeiture, DAILY PRESS (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.dailypress.com/news/crime/dp-nws
-crime-notebook-0405-20150405-story.html [https://perma.cc/XL82-WSJG] (“‘Any property
eligible for forfeiture . . . shall be forfeited only upon the entry of final judgment of
conviction . . . and the exhaustion of all appeals,’ said the House’s bill, sponsored by Del.
Mark Cole, R-Spotsylvania.”).
123 Fain, supra note 93.
124 Id.
125 Presentation, Va. State Crime Comm’n, Asset Forfeiture (SB 684/HB 1287) 85
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://vscc.virginia.gov/Asset%20Forfeiture_FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma
.cc/RTU9-HNLB].
126 VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 114, at 10.
127 Id.
128 S. 457, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016).
129 2016 Session, supra note 25.
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address the central Excessive Fines issue. The Commonwealth can still seize property
from an individual who has been acquitted of an underlying crime,130 resulting in an
excessive fine. The Commonwealth can still seize property from an innocent owner
if their evidence appears to be clear and convincing, and the property claimant still
must show that the property is innocent by a preponderance of the evidence.131
While civil asset forfeiture remains a politically contentious issue, the constitu-
tionality of the practice under an Excessive Fines analysis has not been addressed
by Virginia courts since 1972.132 Absent court articulated doctrine determining when
a civil asset forfeiture becomes an excessive fine, the Commonwealth has broad
authority to seize property through civil asset forfeiture without a constitutional
“check.”133 Virginia addressed this issue in one case from the 1970s, creating a
precedent that would now be inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of civil asset forfeiture (that civil asset forfeitures are not punitive).134
In Commonwealth v. One 1970, 2 Dr. H.T. Lincoln Automobile, Identification
Number OY89A826833135 (Lincoln Automobile), Lindenstruth was driving without
a permit when a Virginia State Trooper stopped him for expired tags.136 Lindenstruth
was convicted, fined $100, sentenced to ten days in jail, and his driving license was
revoked for sixty additional days.137 In addition to the criminal proceeding, the
Commonwealth instituted a forfeiture action against the car Lindenstruth was driving
when he was stopped.138 In this case, the court found that the forfeiture action did
not constitute a penalty, punishment, or a criminal offense, so the Excessive Fines
Clause of the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions did not apply.139
In the decades since Lincoln Automobile was decided, the Supreme Court found
asset forfeitures to be at least partially punitive,140 which subjects civil asset forfeiture
to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.141 Further, in Bajakajian,
the Supreme Court held that forfeiture is unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines
Clause if the forfeiture is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of [the] offense.”142
130 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10 (West 2016) (amending VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10
(West 2015)).
131 Id.
132 Commonwealth v. One 1970, 2 Dr. H.T. Lincoln Auto., Identification No. OY89A826833,
186 S.E.2d 279, 281 (Va. 1972) (finding that the forfeiture of an automobile, regardless of
the expense of the automobile, is allowed under the forfeiture statute and does not constitute
an excessive fine).
133 See id.
134 Id. at 280.
135 186 S.E.2d 279 (Va. 1972).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 281.
140 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1993).
141 Id. at 622.
142 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
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Virginia courts have not articulated a test that determines when civil asset for-
feitures violate the Excessive Fines Clause by being grossly disproportionate. The
Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”143 Virginia’s Constitu-
tion echoes this in article I, section 9, stating “excessive bail ought not to be required,
nor excessive fines imposed[.]”144 Because the U.S. Supreme Court has determined
that civil asset forfeiture is subject to the Excessive Fines Clause,145 and that the
Eighth Amendment requires that the forfeiture be proportional to the underlying
offense, the only existing precedent in Virginia is suspect. Virginian’s constitutional
rights are vulnerable to violation in the absence of a defined Excessive Fines Test.
Virginia Courts can protect against Excessive Fines violations by articulating
a factor-based test that considers (1) the gravity of the offense compared with the
harshness of the forfeiture, and any punishment received for the underlying offense;
(2) whether the property was an integral part of the commission of the crime and
whether there has been a conviction or acquittal for the underlying crime; (3) the
nature and extent of the criminal activity; (4) the owner of the defendant property and
the owner’s knowledge and approval of the criminal use of the property; and (5) the
harm caused by the charged crime.146 While no court has articulated this test, it com-
bines aspects of tests currently used by courts to provide more constitutional pro-
tection to citizens whose assets have been seized.147
III. EXISTING EXCESSIVE FINES TESTS
After the Court declined to articulate an Excessive Fines Test in Austin,148 lower
courts developed different Excessive Fines Tests in civil asset forfeiture cases.149
143 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
144 VA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
145 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
146 See Melissa A. Rolland, Forfeiture Law, the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause, and United States v. Bajakajian, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371 (1999); Skorup,
supra note 11, at 427.
147 See Skorup, supra note 11, at 431, 440.
148 509 U.S. at 622–23 (stating that Austin asked the court to “establish a multifactor test
for determining whether a forfeiture is constitutionally ‘excessive[,]’” but declining that
invitation because the Court of Appeals had “no occasion to consider what factors should
inform such a decision” and “[p]rudence dictate[d] that we allow the lower courts to consider
that question in the first instance”).
149 United States v. 221 Dana Ave., 81 F. Supp. 2d 182, 190 (D. Mass. 2000) (“Since
Austin, three tests have emerged for determining whether a forfeiture violates the Excessive
Fines Clause: 1) the ‘instrumentality’ or ‘nexus’ test which focuses on whether a substantial
connection exists between the alleged wrongs and the property being subjected to forfeiture;
2) the ‘proportionality’ test which compares the harshness of the forfeiture with the severity
of the crime; and 3) the hybrid ‘instrumentality-proportionality’ test which first utilizes an
instrumentality test and then applies a proportionality analysis.”).
1410 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1393
A. Instrumentality Test
Following Austin, many Excessive Fines Tests drew from Justice Scalia’s con-
currence150 where he stated that the question in determining if a fine is excessive “is
not how much the confiscated property is worth, but whether the confiscated property
has a close enough relationship to the offense.”151 This test was referred to as the
“instrumentality test” and generally considered “(1) the nexus between the offense
and the property and the extent of the property’s role in the offense, (2) the role and
culpability of the owner, and (3) the possibility of separating offending property
from the remainder [of the nonguilty property.]”152
In United States v. Chandler,153 the government seized a thirty-three acre
property in North Carolina after finding that the owner distributed small amounts
of cocaine to pay employees for work on the farm and sold bales of marijuana from
a farmhouse and barn.154 The court applied an instrumentality test and found that
there was a substantial nexus between the property and the offense, citing the need
for seclusion that the property provided, the improvement of the property using
proceeds from illegal sales, and the fact that the farmhouse and barn were not easily
separated from the entire thirty-three acres.155
However, the Supreme Court’s articulation of the proportionality test in
Bajakajian made it unclear if the instrumentality test would continue to be valid.156
The Fourth Circuit exemplified this confusion, adopting the grossly disproportional
analysis from Bajakajian in one case,157 while another case resulted in a three-way,
split opinion, with one judge in favor of continued use of the instrumentality test,
one judge noting that the instrumentality test was weak after Bajakajian, and one
judge believing that a proportionality review was required after Bajakajian.158
1. Flaws of the Instrumentality Test
The instrumentality test’s legitimacy has been called into question by the Court’s
ruling in Bajakajian, which indicated that a proportionality test was needed in order
to determine if an excessive fine is being imposed by the government.159 Because the
150 Skorup, supra note 11, at 440 (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 623–28 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
151 Austin, 509 U.S. at 628.
152 United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994).
153 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994).
154 Id. at 360–61.
155 Id. at 365–66.
156 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 333–34 (1998).
157 United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805, 814 (4th Cir. 2000).
158 United States v. Brunk, 11 Fed. App’x 147, 148–49 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
159 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 (“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the
Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality[.]”).
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Supreme Court clearly dictated that a proportionality standard be used,160 a pure instru-
mentality test will not satisfy the constitutionally required standard of proportionality.
B. The Grossly Disproportional Test
The grossly disproportional test has been adopted by many federal circuit courts.161
As laid out by the Supreme Court in Bajakajian, the “touchstone of the constitu-
tional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportional-
ity[.]”162 The Court considered whether the forfeiture was grossly disproportionate
to the gravity of the offense.163 In its decision, the Court recognized that judgments
about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong first to the legislature and
require deference to that body, and that any judicial determination “will be inher-
ently imprecise.”164
While lower courts have adopted variations of this test, the Court in Bajakajian
considered (1) if the crime was related to any other illegal activities; (2) if Bajakajian
fit into the class of persons for whom the statute was principally designed; (3) the
maximum penalties that could have been imposed under the sentencing guidelines;
and (4) the harm that was caused.165 While the specific factors of the test vary from
court to court, courts will generally look to the criminal penalties (fines and jail
time) a claimant would have faced if convicted of the underlying crime and compare
this to the extent of the forfeiture in order to determine excessiveness.166
The Fourth Circuit recently articulated a test similar to the Bajakajian grossly pro-
portional test in United States v. Blackman.167 Here, the court analyzed four factors to
determine if a punitive forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause: “(1) ‘the amount of the forfeiture and its relationship to the authorized penalty;’
(2) ‘the nature and extent of the criminal activity;’ (3) ‘the relationship between the
crime charged and other crimes;’ and (4) ‘the harm caused by the charged crime.’”168
160 Id.
161 Skorup, supra note 11, at 444 (noting that the First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have adopted the grossly disproportionate test).
162 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 336 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); Gore v. United States, 357
U.S. 386, 393 (1958)). The proportionality analysis used with the Excessive Fines Clause is
fact-intensive. This makes it difficult to apply inflexible rules in a proportionality context.
The flexibility that is required when undertaking a proportionality analysis contributes to the
variations in the proportionality factor tests seen in different courts. Id.
165 It is important to note that Bajakajian was not a civil forfeiture case, but a criminal
forfeiture case. Id. at 337–39.
166 Id. at 336–37.
167 746 F.3d 137, 144 (4th Cir. 2014).
168 Id. (quoting United States v. Jalaram, 599 F.3d 347, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2010)).
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1. Flaws of the Grossly Disproportional Test
Much as the instrumentality test alone does not satisfy the grossly dispropor-
tional standard for excessive fines, the proportionality test alone does not meet the
constitutional standard required in a civil asset forfeiture case (versus a criminal
asset forfeiture). The grossly disproportional standard for excessive fines was first
articulated in Bajakajian, where the Court recognized that “[t]he forfeiture in this
case does not bear any of the hallmarks of traditional civil in rem forfeitures[,]”169
and was instead a criminal asset forfeiture.
The difference between civil and criminal forfeiture seems trivial, but both types
of forfeiture are derived from distinct legal histories and purposes, and the proce-
dures used in each type of forfeiture are significantly different.170 Civil forfeitures
are in rem proceedings, or proceedings against property,171 while criminal forfeitures
are in personam.172 Criminal forfeitures provide more protections for defendant
property owners than do civil forfeitures,173 so while a proportionality test may be
appropriate in the context of a criminal asset forfeiture, the use of a proportionality
test alone in civil asset forfeiture cases is inappropriate.
Criminal forfeitures are considered a part of a criminal prosecution, and there-
fore were always considered punitive and subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.174
In criminal forfeiture cases, the burden is on the government to first prove that the
defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of an underlying crime.175 After this
has been established, an asset forfeiture analysis takes place after the conviction, again
with the government bearing the initial burden of proving that property should be
forfeited either “beyond a reasonable doubt” or by “a preponderance of evidence.”176
169 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 331; id at 328 (describing the procedures used in Bajakajian
to pursue a criminal forfeiture and pointing out that forfeiture is imposed at the culmination
of a criminal proceeding and required conviction of an underlying felony).
170 See Terrance G. Reed, On the Importance of Being Civil: Constitutional Limitations
on Civil Forfeiture, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 255, 257 (1994).
171 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 330 (“Historically, the conduct of the property owner was
irrelevant; indeed, the owner of forfeited property could be entirely innocent of any crime.”).
172 See id. at 332; Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39–40 (1995); United States v.
Casey, 444 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006).
173 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 24, at 47–48; Skorup, supra note 11, at 434.
174 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 332 (“[I]n personam, criminal forfeitures . . . have historically
been treated as punitive, being part of the punishment imposed for felonies and treason in the
Middle Ages and at common law.”). Criminal forfeiture was explicitly rejected by the First
Congress and was banned in the United States until the 1970s, when Congress brought back
the practice with the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and the Comprehensive Drug
Control and Prevention Act of 1970. Id. at 332 n.7.
175 See Reed, supra note 170, at 267.
176 Id.
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Civil asset forfeiture cases are in rem, or against the property, not a person.177
A conviction is not required in order to commence a civil asset forfeiture action,
and, as it is not considered a criminal punishment, the burden of proof is easier to
meet in civil cases (clear and convincing evidence in Virginia)178 and is shifted from
the government to the defendant owner of the property.179 The legal fiction of
“guilty property” is still valid in civil asset forfeiture.180
Interestingly, in Virginia, a civil asset forfeiture proceeding can be brought prior
to a conviction of an underlying crime for money laundering and illegal drug trans-
actions, but cannot be brought prior to a conviction for other types of crimes including
abduction, kidnapping, extortion, prostitution, sex trafficking, and cruelty and in-
juries to children.181
The type of property seized in civil asset forfeiture cases in Virginia can be
anything—from property used directly in the commission of a crime to property
gained from profits of a crime.182 Property that is not directly engaged in a crime is
considered to be an instrumentality.183 It is not illegal to possess these instrumentali-
ties (e.g., it is not illegal to possess a car, house, boat, jewelry, or sneakers) like it
is illegal to possess contraband (e.g., kinder eggs, counterfeit money, or child por-
nography).184 “Instrumentalities historically have been treated as a form of ‘guilty
property’ that can be forfeited in civil in rem proceedings.”185
In order to determine if instrumentalities are “guilty” and may be forfeited to the
State, the court must look to the connection between the property and the underlying
criminal offense.186 This is why a proportionality test alone cannot be applied to civil
asset forfeiture cases; because civil forfeitures are in rem, the court must connect
property to an underlying crime, requiring that a nexus analysis be made.187 If an in-
strumentality analysis is not made, the court is essentially performing an in personam
analysis, which ignores the property and does not consider that civil forfeiture does
177 See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14–15 (1827) (“The thing here is primarily
considered as the offender. . . . [T]he proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly
unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.”); Charmin Bortz Shiely, Note, United
States v. Bajakajian: Will a New Standard for Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to Criminal
Forfeitures Affect Civil Forfeiture Analysis?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1606–07 (1999).
178 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10 (West 2016) (amending VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10
(West 2015)).
179 See Reed, supra note 170, at 266.
180 Id. at 277.
181 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.35 (West 2016).
182 FORFEITED ASSET SHARING PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 18, at 1.
183 See Skorup, supra note 11, at 448.
184 Id.
185 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 333 (1998).
186 Id. at 333–34; Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 628 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
187 See generally Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321.
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not require a conviction of the owner of the property, but only requires the property
to be guilty.188
Proportionality tests also usually require that a comparison be made between the
forfeited asset and the sentence or fine imposed for the underlying crime.189 This is
problematic when dealing with civil asset forfeiture as there is not always an under-
lying conviction in civil asset forfeiture cases. To compare a civil asset forfeiture to
the criminal sentence required for an underlying crime, a crime that the owner of the
property has not been convicted of, necessarily results in an excessive fine.
Comparing the forfeited property to the sentence or fine imposed for the under-
lying crime may become problematic for reasons articulated in Lincoln Automobile:
forfeiture of property that is more expensive could be considered “excessive” while
forfeiture of the same type of property that has a lower value may not be considered
excessive.190 For example, a forfeited Ferrari may constitute an excessive fine when
compared to the suggested fine for the underlying crime, while a forfeited Hyundai
that participated in the same underlying crime may not constitute an excessive fine
because the value of a Hyundai is so much less than a Ferrari. In this way, a strict
proportionality analysis may discriminate against poor owners who own less ex-
pensive property that may be forfeited, while more expensive property may not be
forfeited because it would violate the Excessive Fines Clause under a strict propor-
tionality standard.
Further, the difference between the burden of proof required for criminal asset
forfeiture (where it has been proven that a person committed a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt) and civil asset forfeiture (preponderance of the evidence or clear
and convincing evidence in Virginia),191 indicates that property could be forfeited
while there still may be some doubt regarding the use of the forfeited property to
commit the underlying crime.192
C. The Hybrid Instrumentality-Proportionality Test
Under the hybrid instrumentality-proportionality test, the property seized must
be both proportionate to the underlying crime and an integral party to the underlying
crime.193 The court will typically consider (1) the gravity of the offense compared
with the harshness of the forfeiture; (2) whether the property was an integral part of
188 See Skorup, supra note 11, at 448–49.
189 Id. at 449–51.
190 See Virginia v. One 1970, 2 Dr. H.T. Lincoln Automobile, Identification Number
OY89A826833, 186 S.E.2d 279, 281 (Va. 1972).
191 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10 (West 2016) (amending VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10
(West 2015)).
192 See Skorup, supra note 11, at 451–52.
193 See United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 732 (C.D. Cal. 1994);
Skorup, supra note 11, at 441.
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the commission of the crime; and (3) whether the criminal activity involving the
defendant property was extensive in terms of time and special use.194
The District Court for the Central District of California first applied this test in
United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive.195 In this case, a property owner allowed his son
to live in his house, where the son subsequently sold illicit drugs.196 The property
owner’s son was charged and convicted of possession and sale of narcotics and a
forfeiture action against the real property was initiated.197 The property owner was
charged with, but acquitted of, the same crimes.198 When considering these factors,
the court found that the harshness of the forfeiture outweighed the gravity of the of-
fense, pointing out that the property owner was acquitted of all charges.199 The court
also found that the property was not an integral part of the commission of the crime,
stating that the “Defendant Property is nothing more than a place at which drugs
were sold. There is no other link between the property and the illegal activity.”200
Finally, the court found that the criminal activity was extensive in terms of spatial
use of the Defendant Property, but as this was the only factor that weighed in favor
of forfeiture, and the factors are not individually dispositive, the court found that the
forfeiture of the Defendant Property would violate the Excessive Fines Clause.201
In effect, the hybrid test combines the proportionality test and the instrumental-
ity test. It follows the Supreme Court’s dicta in Bajakajian, but also recognizes the
importance of instrumentality in avoiding Excessive Fines violations.202
1. Flaws of the Hybrid Instrumentality-Proportionality Test
Out of the existing tests, the hybrid instrumentality-proportionality test provides
the most protection against excessive fines in civil asset forfeiture cases. This test
places a heavier burden on the government during civil asset forfeiture proceedings
because both the proportionality and instrumentality tests must be satisfied in order
for a forfeiture to be valid.203 It is necessarily more difficult for the government to
194 See 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. at 732.
195 845 F. Supp. 725, 725 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
196 Id. at 730.
197 Id. (stating that 152 grams of cocaine, 4.7 grams of psilocybin, and one marijuana plant
were removed from the Defendant Property, that the street value of the cocaine was $15,200,
and that the Defendant Property was worth $925,000 and the owner had $625,000 in equity
in that property).
198 Id. at 736.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 738 (stating that the “forfeiture of the Defendant Property in this case does not rid
society of the instrumentality of the crime or eliminate the resources of any criminal enterprise”).
201 Id.
202 See id. at 737.
203 See generally United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
221 Dana Ave., 81 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D. Mass. 2000).
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succeed with a civil asset forfeiture claim under this test, and therefore does more
to protect both innocent and guilty owners from excessive fines.204 However, the
hybrid instrumentality-proportionality test still fails to consider important aspects
inherent in civil asset forfeiture—like punishment already received for an underlying
offense, whether there has been a conviction or acquittal for the underlying offense,
an innocent owner defense, and the implication of victimless crimes on punishment—
that should be considered in order to protect citizens from excessive fines.
IV. PROPOSED TEST
The Virginia Crime Commission has recognized that while the “Eighth Amend-
ment does apply, and in theory would prohibit an excessive forfeiture for minor
wrongdoing. . . . In practice, forfeitures are almost never found to have violated the
Eighth Amendment.”205 In Virginia, courts can provide protection from excessive
fines by articulating a factor-based test that considers (1) the gravity of the offense
compared with the harshness of the forfeiture, and whether the property was an
integral part of the commission of the crime; (2) whether there has been a conviction
or acquittal for the underlying crime and any punishment already received for the
underlying offense; (3) the nature and extent of the criminal activity; (4) the owner
of the defendant property and the owner’s knowledge and approval of the criminal
use of the property; and (5) the harm caused by the charged crime.
This test is the most appropriate in consideration of Commonwealth laws that
allow civil asset forfeiture cases to be concluded prior to any underlying criminal
case. Commonwealth laws allow significant leeway for civil asset forfeiture and the
Commonwealth needs a strong test to protect citizens from excessive fines and law
enforcement from the temptation of using forfeiture as a source of revenue.
A. The Gravity of the Offense Compared with the Harshness of the Forfeiture and
Whether the Property Was an Integral Part of the Commission of the Crime
An appropriate Excessive Fines Test for civil asset forfeitures must include con-
sideration of proportionality and instrumentalities. In Bajakajian, the Court deter-
mined that the grossly disproportionate standard would be used to determine an
excessive fine.206 However, the question of disproportionality is not as straight
forward in civil forfeiture cases. Civil forfeitures involve property, not people.207
Because of this, the court must first determine whether the property can be consid-
ered “guilty” of an offense and can do so by asking whether the property was an
integral part of the commission of the crime.
204 See generally Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841; 221 Dana Ave., 81 F. Supp. 2d 182.
205 See Va. State Crime Comm’n, supra note 125, at 33 (citing Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602 (1993)).
206 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
207 Id. at 330.
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After determining that the property is in fact “guilty,” the court can meet the
grossly disproportionate standard by comparing the gravity of the offense with the
harshness of the forfeiture. Without first determining that the property is an instru-
mentality of the crime, the court cannot determine if the forfeiture is disproportionate.
It may seem that requiring forfeited property to be an integral part of the com-
mission of the underlying crime will weaken Virginia’s legislation that allows the
state to seize any property derived from illegal drug transactions. Currently, the
Commonwealth must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the property is
substantially connected to the crime.208 By requiring that the Commonwealth tie the
forfeiture of property to the property’s use in the commission of the crime, it is not
diminishing the legislation but making the legal concept of “guilty property” more
legitimate. When property is actually used in the commission of a guilty act, the
property can be viewed as guilty. If the property is not used to commit a criminal
act, it is difficult to understand how the property can still be considered guilty under
the concept of guilty property given to us in The Palmyra.209
B. Whether There Has Been a Conviction or Acquittal for the Underlying Crime
and Any Punishment Already Received for the Underlying Offense
In Austin, the Supreme Court recognized that civil asset forfeiture was at least
partially punitive.210 Because it is partially punitive, it follows that the civil asset
forfeiture is intended as part of the punishment for some criminal offense, and
should therefore be considered against the backdrop of the entirety of the punish-
ment. If a defendant is convicted of, or pleads to, a crime, the criminal justice system
has developed sentencing guidelines to advise judges on the appropriate punishment
for that crime. When determining a criminal fine or sentence, judges do not consider
a pending civil forfeiture as part of the punishment.211 Similarly, judges determining
civil asset forfeiture do not always consider the punishment implemented by a criminal
court for the same underlying crime that supports the civil forfeiture.212 Though the
Court has found that this does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,213 an exces-
sive fine could result from a situation where criminal fines have already been paid.
For example, consider a case where a defendant is charged with a minor drug
crime, and both a substantial fine and jail time are imposed as punishment in the
208 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10 (West 2016) (amending VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10
(West 2015)).
209 See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
210 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 621–22.
211 See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996).
212 Id.
213 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331 (1998) (“Recognizing the non-
punitive character of such proceedings, we have held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not bar the institution of a civil, in rem forfeiture action after the criminal conviction of the
defendant.”); Ursery, 518 U.S. at 292.
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criminal proceeding. Then, a case against the defendant’s property is pursued by the
state and a large portion of property or high-value property (like real property) is
seized. This should be considered excessive as the defendant has already been fined
by the criminal court, and is being fined a second time for the same criminal conduct
in the civil court. While the state would likely argue that as long as the total seizure,
when both the criminal and civil courts are considered, is below the statutory maxi-
mum, then the forfeiture should not be considered excessive. However, if a criminal
court determined an appropriate fine that falls within the sentencing guidelines,
based on evidence available in a criminal proceeding, the increase in fine for the same
underlying criminal conduct in a civil court should be evaluated for excessiveness.
Similarly, a conviction or acquittal for an underlying crime should be taken into
consideration by the court when determining if a civil asset forfeiture is grossly
disproportionate. At times, civil asset forfeiture may be used as a tool by prosecutors
in order to punish a defendant who has been acquitted who they think is guilty, or
to enact a harsher punishment than the courts were willing to give.214 However, if
the government pursues a forfeiture action against a property owner who has been
acquitted of the underlying crime, the government is essentially pursuing a forfeiture
in order to punish an owner who has not been proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The traditional response to this argument would likely resort to the legal
fiction that civil asset forfeiture is an action against guilty property, not an owner.
However, since Austin determined that civil asset forfeiture is partially punitive, this
argument is not valid.215 The forfeiture is at least partially punishing the owner for
the property’s involvement in an underlying crime, even if the owner has not been
convicted of, or has been acquitted of, the underlying crime. Any punishment of an
innocent owner should be seen as grossly disproportionate to the underlying crime
(since there is no underlying crime) and would be considered an excessive fine.
The conviction of a property owner of an underlying crime should be considered
because the crime the defendant was convicted of will have a considerable impact
on the determination of what is and is not considered proportionate. A conviction
for drug distribution may have a heavier possible sentence than possession with
intent, which may have a heavier sentence than simple possession. Further, the
conviction of a crime will likely mean that criminal punishment has been imposed.
214 See Craig Gaumer, A Prosecutor’s Secret Weapon: Federal Civil Forfeiture Law, U.S.
ATT’YS’ BULL., Nov. 2007, at 59, 67, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy
/2007/12/21/usab5506.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EH5-5XSG] (“Federal civil forfeiture law is
a prosecutor’s secret weapon, a valuable tool used to guarantee that wrongdoers do not reap
the financial benefits of criminal activity or continue to use the tools of their illegal trade.”
“Parallel civil forfeiture and criminal proceedings, if done properly, may serve as a valid and
invaluable tool to preserve tainted property, where the government is not yet ready to indict
the owner but does not want the property to be sold or otherwise transferred, damaged,
dissipated, or hidden.”).
215 See generally Austin, 509 U.S. 602.
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If criminal punishment is imposed, a civil forfeiture punishment should be consid-
ered in light of the criminal punishment to ensure that the combination of the two
punishments does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause.
C. The Nature and Extent of the Criminal Activity
When the government seizes assets through civil forfeiture, the nature and extent
of criminal activity should be considered when determining whether the forfeiture
is excessive. The difficulty in defining excessiveness arises from the fact that the
question is so fact specific; what may be excessive under one set of facts would not
necessarily be considered excessive under another.
The nature of the crime is important in the statutory context of civil asset for-
feiture.216 The resurgence of civil asset forfeiture, at both the federal and state level,
was a result of the “War on Drugs,” and civil forfeiture has primarily been used as
a tool to fight drug trafficking.217 If a person is charged with a drug crime, it is more
likely that civil asset forfeiture will be used against them because the legislature
intended to prevent drug crimes when passing civil asset forfeitures laws and because
the local police force is currently allowed to reap the rewards of their forfeitures.218
This is shown in statutes that provide more protections for civil asset forfeitures
deriving from abduction, kidnapping, extortion, prostitution, sex trafficking, and
cruelty and injuries to children than the protections provided for drug related asset
forfeitures.219 Further, it is important to consider if the crime was a violent or non-
violent crime, had victims or was victimless, and was intentional or unintentional.
The nature of a crime speaks directly to the gravity of the offense, which is necessary
to determine proportionality.
The extent of the crime should also be taken into consideration. A fine of $500,000
may be reasonable for a high-level drug trafficker, but would be inappropriate for
a crime consisting of simple possession or one charge of intent to distribute. As the ex-
tent of the criminal operation increases, it is logical that the fine also increases. Under
current civil asset forfeiture Excessive Fines Tests, the extent of the crime is not
always considered.220 In a criminal case, the extent of the criminal activity has not
necessarily been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; only a certain charge (or charges)
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, a defendant may be
found guilty of possession of ten grams of an illicit drug, when the prosecution
216 See United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 733 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
217 See supra Part I.
218 Austin, 509 U.S. at 620 (stating that “Congress has chosen to tie forfeiture directly to
the commission of drug offenses. . . . Congress recognized ‘that the traditional criminal
sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable
trade in dangerous drugs.’”(quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 191 (1983))).
219 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.35 (West 2016).
220 See supra Part III.
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really believes the defendant possessed ten kilograms of the drug, but could not prove
it beyond a reasonable doubt. In civil asset forfeiture cases in Virginia, evidence that
supports the forfeiture only has to be proven by clear and convincing evidence.221
Because of this, it is possible that a fine would be excessive based on the charges
proven in a criminal court, but not based on what is proven “by clear and convincing
evidence” in the civil court.222
Considering the extent of the criminal enterprise should result in a higher bar for
forfeitures of property that cannot be sufficiently connected to a crime or conspiracy,
which will prevent the state from violating the Excessive Fines Clause by seizing in-
nocent property. At the same time, considering the extent of the criminal enterprise
should serve justice by resulting in more severe penalties for high-level traffickers.
While the extent of the criminal activity should be considered, the extent of the
criminal enterprise proven beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal court should be
the basis of this analysis.
D. The Owner of the Defendant Property and the Owner’s Knowledge and
Approval of the Criminal Use of the Property
For an innocent owner, any civil asset forfeiture of their property is an excessive
fine. Innocent owners who have their property seized are not only penalized through
forfeiture, but also through the costly legal process required to retrieve their property
from the government.223 Often, innocent owners choose to settle with the state and
recover less than the full amount or value of property that was seized in order to
avoid the protracted legal process.224 Because these cases frequently settle, Virginia’s
protection for innocent owners—the payment of attorney’s fees if the owner suc-
ceeds in proving the property is innocent225—does not provide much protection for
innocent owners in reality. If the owner’s knowledge and approval of the criminal
use of the defendant property is consistently considered by the court when determin-
ing proportionality in excessive fines cases, innocent owners will be more likely to
pursue cases and less likely to settle with the government. This will help prevent the
unconstitutionally excessive permanent forfeiture of an innocent owner’s property
221 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10 (West 2016) (amending VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10
(West 2015)).
222 Id.; see supra Part III.
223 See Chi, supra note 5, 1641–42 (“Claimants whose assets have been seized have a right
to rebut the presumption of forfeitability at a hearing, but are generally not permitted to use those
assets to retain a lawyer. Even when they cannot afford representation, they are not guaranteed
a court-appointed attorney.”(footnote omitted)); NBC29 Special Report, supra note 1.
224 See Va. State Crime Comm’n, supra note 125, at 85; Michael Greibrok, Settlement:
Another Arrow in the Government’s Civil Asset Forfeiture Quiver, FREEDOMWORKS (June 12,
2015), http://www.freedomworks.org/content/settlement-another-arrow-government%E2%80
%99s-civil-asset-forfeiture-quiver [https://perma.cc/5ZWK-MZZB].
225 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.12(B) (West 2016).
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by providing innocent owners with more options for recovery. The owner’s knowl-
edge and approval is an important consideration in civil asset forfeiture cases. In
6625 Zumirez Drive, the son had the owner’s approval to live in the house that was
being forfeited, but the property owner may not have known or approved of the drug
transactions occurring.226 This same scenario can play out with vehicles, when a
parent or associate allows another to use their vehicle without prior knowledge or
approval of any criminal activity. Anecdotal evidence shows that these scenarios do
occur in Virginia.227
E. Harm Caused by Crime (Victimless Crimes)
The Court in Bajakajian considered the harm caused by the crime and deter-
mined that a failure to report cash when leaving the country did not cause significant
harm, as the money was legally obtained and would be used to pay a legal debt.228
This indicates that the harm caused by the underlying crime should be considered
when the excessiveness of a forfeiture is in question. It is arguable that certain crimes,
such as prostitution, public drunkenness, gambling and drug use, are “victimless
crimes” and as such the punishment for their fines should be less severe. If the
criminal punishment for victimless crimes is less severe, it follows that the civil
punishment should be less severe as well.
It is important to note that none of these factors should be considered individu-
ally dispositive, but rather should be balanced in order to reach the most equitable
result. The factors chosen for this test were chosen because they combine consider-
ations from the instrumentality test, the proportionality test, and the hybrid test, and
include the consideration of innocent owners. The resulting test, while long, provides
a higher barrier to the government, which stands to benefit from forfeitures. This
helps protect citizens from unconstitutional forfeitures. In Virginia, a test is needed
in order to protect citizens from unconstitutional forfeitures. The test proposed in
this Note will protect citizens from unconstitutional, excessive forfeitures.
CONCLUSION
The overzealous use of civil asset forfeiture will likely continue as long as a
revenue-raising incentive exists.229 In the abstract, the official motive behind civil
asset forfeiture is legitimate. It is unlikely that any law-abiding citizen supports the
fact that drug dealers and criminals profit from their crimes. In practice however, the
official motive is overshadowed by the revenue-raising incentives inherent in civil
226 See United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 736 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
227 See generally Bowes, supra note 20; Bullock, supra note 15; NBC29 Special Report,
supra note 1; Stillman, supra note 37.
228 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339 (1998).
229 See CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 10, at 6.
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asset forfeiture.230 Constitutional issues arise when civil asset forfeitures begin to
jeopardize the rights of innocent citizens and violate the Excessive Fines Clauses of
the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions.
Virginia courts can protect both innocent and guilty property owners from ex-
cessive fines by increasing the burden on the Commonwealth in civil forfeiture actions.
By instituting the proposed five-factor test that carefully considers all aspects and
ramifications of a civil asset forfeiture, the government will face a higher bar in civil
forfeiture cases. A standard that is more difficult to meet may dissuade the Common-
wealth from instigating questionable civil forfeitures that have high profit incentives
because they are more likely to be subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.
Perhaps, if this standard was in place when Mandrel Stuart was pulled over by
police in Virginia, the officers would have thought twice about seizing his $17,000.231
If the police had not seized his cash, perhaps Stuart would still be serving delicious
BBQ to Virginians instead of having to close his restaurant because of the financial
burden placed on him by the asset forfeiture process.232 Unfortunately, because of
civil asset forfeiture, we will never know.
230 See supra Part I.
231 See NBC29 Special Report, supra note 1.
232 See id.
